\begin{table}[H] \centering
\newcolumntype{R}{>{\raggedleft\arraybackslash}X}
\newcolumntype{L}{>{\raggedright\arraybackslash}X}
\newcolumntype{C}{>{\centering\arraybackslash}X}

\caption{Heterogeneity by constraints on the executive}
\label{tab:baseline_het_global_checks_power}
\begin{tabularx}{\linewidth}{@{}lCCCCCC@{}}

\toprule
 & &  \multicolumn{2}{c}{\textbf{Leader power}} & \multicolumn{2}{c}{\textbf{Globalization}} & \textbf{Term} \\  & & \multicolumn{2}{c}{\textbf{}} & \multicolumn{2}{c}{\textbf{}} & \textbf{limit} \tabularnewline & (1) & (2) & (3) & (4) & (5) & (6)  \tabularnewline 
{}&{Baseline}&{High}&{Low}&{High}&{Low}&{No} \tabularnewline
\midrule \addlinespace[\belowrulesep]
\textbf{Economic performance}&0.269***&0.463***&0.097&0.278***&0.345***&0.210** \tabularnewline
&(0.101)&(0.142)&(0.170)&(0.121)&(0.148)&(0.105) \tabularnewline
\textbf{HDI}&0.197&0.186&0.221&0.306&0.105&0.040 \tabularnewline
&(0.167)&(0.219)&(0.264)&(0.246)&(0.260)&(0.187) \tabularnewline
\textbf{Democracy}&0.192**&0.239&-0.082&0.065&0.512***&0.179 \tabularnewline
&(0.101)&(0.189)&(0.152)&(0.146)&(0.202)&(0.117) \tabularnewline
\textbf{General index}&0.276***&0.389***&0.033&0.309***&0.417***&0.221** \tabularnewline
&(0.105)&(0.160)&(0.142)&(0.119)&(0.145)&(0.109) \tabularnewline
\bottomrule \addlinespace[\belowrulesep]

\end{tabularx}
\\ \parbox{\linewidth}{\footnotesize \caption*{\footnotesize \emph{Notes}: This table reports estimated effects of electoral turnovers for different subsamples. Each estimate corresponds to a separate regression. The power enjoyed by the elected leader is an aggregate of power measures from V-Dem: power to dissolve the legislature, to appoint and dismiss ministers, and to propose and veto legislation (see Appendix \ref{subsec:regime_char} for more details). We proxy globalization with trade intensity. For these two dimensions of heterogeneity, we consider the value of the variable in the year before each election, compute the median among close elections (i.e., elections for which the running variable is under 15 percentage points in absolute value), and split the sample between elections above and below the median. In column (6), we restrict the sample to parliamentary elections and presidential elections for which there were no differentially binding term limits for the incumbent and the best ranked challenger. Using the method of \cite{clogg1995statistical}, we can marginally reject the equality of the estimates for the general index for high and low leader power (p-val. =  0.096), but not for high and low globalization (p-val. =  0.565). We obtain broadly consistent results when running a parametric regression in which we include the interaction between the treatment and the dimension of heterogeneity.  $^{*} p<0.10,^{**} p<0.05,^{***} p<0.01$.}}
\end{table}
